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Liam Kennedy
1 Transatlantic relations, a symbolic linchpin of the Western-led global order, are in a
parlous state, reflecting both internal crises in the US and in many European nations
and a loss of  faith in broader visions of  supranational  alliances.  The relations have
recently come to seem further imperiled, perhaps terminally so, with multiple tensions
surrounding  the  COVID-19  pandemic  and  the  protests  in  solidarity  with  those
protesting the death of George Floyd in the US. Neither emergency has triggered a
reinvestment in multilateral actions, rather they have rigidified ideologies of political
elites,  revealed  the  unpreparedness  of  Western  states  for  crisis  management,  and
exposed the hollowness of grand narratives and geopolitical fantasies—not least those
of “the West” and “transatlanticism.” To the degree that these emergencies have been
thought  together  they  have  been  all  too  casually  conflated  in  the  European
imagination, not least as moral judgments about the leadership of President Donald
Trump. Over the last four years, Europeans have moved from shock at Trump’s election
to confusion about what this means for the Atlantic alliance to increasing repudiation
of American leadership and are now beginning to imagine a world order that the US is
not  at  the  centre  of.  Yet,  there  is  great  uncertainty  about  the  interregnum of  the
present, as the new order is not yet formed, and the pandemic and race emergencies
not only intensify European rejection of the US, they reveal the frailty of the “European
project” and anxiety about the future of Europe.
2 Underlying this shift in European perceptions of the US is a deep but barely coherent
disinvestment in the fantasy of “America” as a liberal and redemptive power.1 This has
been a sustaining fantasy for European political and popular cultures since the end of
WW2.  It  is  a  fantasy  that  links  affect  to  political  life,  fetishizes  the  transatlantic
relationship, and functions to contain the traumatic specters of violence and exclusion
that  underpin  the  making  of  European  identity  (Kroes,  Kennedy  145-50).  Hannah
Arendt  observed in  a  1954  essay  that  “[e]ver  since  this  part  of  European mankind
ceased  to  be  a  colony,  framed  its  Constitution  and  declared  itself  an  independent
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Republic, America has been both the dream and the nightmare of Europe” (Arendt). At
the time, Arendt was concerned that this imagining fed an emergent anti-Americanism
in Europe, repudiating the US as an embodiment of the latest stage of modernity that
prefigured  Europe’s  development.  And  so,  she  argued,  Europe  “tries  to  escape  the
consequences  of  her  own  history  under  the  pretext  of  separating  from  America”
(Arendt). While the conditions of this imagining have shifted, Arendt’s insight―that
via repudiation of the US Europe disavows what it does not want to acknowledge in its
own formations―has remained a core feature of the fantasy. Fascination and contempt
are bound together in this fantasy, it is dependent on what is known but cannot be
acknowledged: a fear of and desire for American power. It provides Europeans with the
balm of calling out America hypocrisy in the misuse of its powers, often measured in
the distance between its  soft  power rhetoric  and hard power actions.  A moralizing
language of critique and repudiation is commonplace in European commentaries on
Trump’s  perceived failings in dealing with domestic  and international  emergencies.
The moralizing rarely reflects so stringently on European shortcomings though, and is
echoed in the common rejoinder of those who insist on European exceptionalism: “This
is not America.”2
3 The health and race emergencies of 2020 may prove to be yet another cycle in this
dramaturgy, but there are indicators of a deeper unraveling of the fantasy. The distinct
yet complexly related emergencies signify a conjunctural moment in which geopolitical
and biopolitical  challenges to both the European project  and transatlantic  relations
have  converged  around  recognition  of  the  fragilities  of  social  administration  and
political  governance  and  the  vulnerability  of  marginal  peoples,  due  both  to  the




4 The naturalization of the West as a normative model of global order has been under
strain for some time as the once hegemonic power of liberal market economies lose
their allure. It has been severely tested by the shifting power dynamics caused by major
geopolitical and technological changes, and the emergence of illiberal nationalism and
concomitant backlash against globalization. These shifts have exacerbated tensions in
transatlantic unity, which have steadily mounted since the endings of the Cold War,
signaling a  divergence  that  is  structural  and not  simply  a  response  to  the  style  of
particular political leaders. With the US turning away from international commitments
and American foreign policy pivoting to the Pacific  the reluctance of  Europeans to
accept the changing geopolitical realities is telling. That relations have reached a nadir
has become a commonplace observation among European commentators: “European
diplomats privately admit transatlantic relations are at their lowest point since the end
of the Cold War, including during the 2003 Iraq War. Previous US-EU disagreements
have been over policies. Today, the very concept and value of transatlantic unity is
questioned” (Whineray).
5 This questioning of transatlantic relations is not new but there is reluctance among
policy elites in Europe to explore it too closely or fully acknowledge the underlying
paradigm  change  of  which  successive  disruptions  in  transatlantic  relations  are
symptoms. In this vacuum they try to ignore the epistemic pressure on frames and
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practices of knowledge production in relation to transatlanticism. For those, sometimes
termed “Atlanticists,” who have long invested in the relationship between the US and
Western European powers as a privileged axis of global order and stability, it is hard to
let go of this illusion today. They continue to speak of “shared values” tying Europe and
the US but are rarely clear what these are. The anxiety about the relationship is most
keenly  felt  in  Europe  where  transatlanticism  is  institutionalized  in  a  plethora  of
thinktanks, university programs, fellowships and publications. The American journalist
Madeleine  Schwartz,  on a  fellowship visit  to  Germany in  the  summer of  2018,  was
dumbfounded to find that “transatlanticism is everywhere in Berlin. Everyone I met in
my new life as a journalist abroad seemed to be an emissary of the Atlantic project,”
and surmised that “[t]he relationship thrives in the many networks rallying for its
existence in the face of possible decline” (Schwartz). Schwartz comments on the both
the vacuity and usefulness of Atlanticism as a policy concept:
In  the  language  of thinktanks  and funds,  ‘Atlantic’  designates  not  a  real  set of
values so much as an empty form that can be filled with whatever meaning its
organisers want: liberal democracy, the diplomatic partnership between the US and
Europe, or the simple continuation of structures set up after the second world war
and not redefined since…. Whatever happens in the most recent crisis, there will
still be Atlanticism, a nebulous set of ideals harking back to the end of the second
world  war.  Its  vagueness  is  too  useful:  political  opportunism dignified with the
weight of history. (Schwartz)
6 The elite discourse of “transtlanticism” continues to appear in news media and policy
speak in Europe though has almost disappeared in the US (Garton Ash). It is an example
of the investment in fantasy that elides the reality of Europe’s asymmetric dependence
on the US.
7 The fault lines were visible at the Munich Security Conference in February 2020, an
annual  gathering  of  international  policymakers  and  a  barometer  of  transatlantic
relations. The last few conferences have been tense affairs, reflecting growing schisms
on a  range  of  issues.  At  the  2020  conference  the  tensions  spilled  over  into  heated
discourse, with European speakers expressing the growing sense that Europe needs to
“go its own way,” while American speakers scolded Europeans about their failure to
understand the security threats posed by China. The hosts chose “Westlessness” as the
conference theme, defining it as “a widespread feeling of uneasiness and restlessness in
the face of increasing uncertainty about the enduring purpose of the West” (Munich
Security  Report  2020).  This  seemed  to  signal  an  introspective  focus  but  was  also
intended to challenge assumptions about the purpose of the West and by implication of
transatlantic  relations,  and  force  acknowledgement  of  an  emerging  world  order  in
which the West is less dominant. Leading European speakers were blunt about the new
realities and overtly critical of the Trump administration’s “America First” approach to
foreign affairs. German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier, in his speech opening the
conference,  remarked  the  US  administration  “rejects  the  very  concept  of  the
international community,” while the EU’s foreign policy chief Josep Borrell called for
the EU to “develop an appetite for power” (“EU Must Develop Appetite for Power”).
That appetite remained reigned in however, with Germany and France unable to reach
an accord on how it should be enacted. French President Emmanuel Macron was bullish
in his speech, warning that on security issues Europe “cannot always go through the
United States, no, we have to think in a European way,” promoting a strategic dialogue
on defence that would include a European nuclear deterrent (Knight). With Germany
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remaining sceptical though and hindered by a deracinated leadership the forging of a
grand bargain remained moot.
8 The US had a strong presence at the conference, led by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo
and US Defense Secretary Mark Esper and over 40 congressmen and women from both
parties, including House Speaker Nancy Pelosi. They were somewhat taken aback by the
theme of  the conference and the tone of  some of  the European speakers.  Pompeo,
pushing back against Steinmeier’s speech, asserted “I’m happy to report that the death
of the transatlantic alliance is grossly overexaggerated. The West is winning, and we’re
winning together.” He also repeated in order to rebut some of Steinmeier’s comments
about the Trump administration’s unilateralism, saying “I’m here to tell you the facts….
Those statements do not reflect reality…. Let’s be straight up: The U.S. is out there
fighting  for  sovereignty  and  our  friends”  (Birnbaum,  Hudson  and  Morris). The
predominant message from the Americans to the Europeans was to get into line on
security issues and especially on the threat posed by Huawei, with many expressing
anger or incomprehension at Europe’s decision to give the Chinese company access to
5G  networks.  Esper  stated  that  “Huawei  and  5G  is  a  textbook  example  of  China’s
strategy  to  destabilize  and to  dominate”  (Wintour).  Pelosi  concurred,  warning  that
working with Huawei was like “choosing autocracy over democracy on the information
highway”  (Knutson). Yet,  in  response  to  a  question  after  his  speech,  Esper
acknowledged that the US did not have an obvious alternative. And so, the Europeans
and Americans talked past each other, unable or unwilling to find common ground and
barely able to raise the fig leaf of “common values” to signify their bond as pillars of
the West.
9 The Munich conference signaled an effort by some members of the European policy
elite to finally address some of the elephants in the transatlantic room but the rhetoric
lacked conviction in the face of uneasy member states hobbled by national interests
and distrust.  As Jeremy Shapiro has observed of  the Munich gathering,  “for all  the
destabilizing developments in Europe’s neighborhood, the member states clearly prefer
the old bargain that has served them so well. For the most part, they will cling to it
until  its  demise  becomes  clearer  than  truth”  (Shapiro).  Beyond  the  policy  elites
however many Europeans are tiring of the old bargain, and the presidency of Trump
has clearly increased their disenchantment with the US. They watched the US pull out
of the Paris climate accords and withdraw from multilateral  commitments globally.
They listened to Trump call NATO “obsolete” and to his many aggressive statements
about  Europe.  In  early  February  2020,  a  week  before  the  Munich  conference,  the
American president told a gathering of US governors:  “Europe has been treating us
very  badly. European  Union. It  was  really  formed  so  they  could  treat  us  badly”
(“Remarks by President Trump”). The European discontent with and disdain for Trump
became a significant undercurrent of frustration that would find dramatic expression
in responses to the health and race emergencies of 2020.
 
2. Covid-19
10 “Coronavirus:  Pandemic  Plunges  Transatlantic  Relationship  Into  Coma,”  read  the
headline in Le Figaro in April 2020, and it was echoed in several European countries
beyond France (Lasserre). European media reported a widespread sense of disillusion at
Trump’s  mismanagement  of  the coronavirus  outbreak  domestically  and
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internationally,  expressing  a  sense  of  disbelief  at  how  quickly  the  US  became  the
epicentre  of  the  pandemic,  and  pointing  up  an  acceleration  of  American  decline.
Writing  in  the  Irish  Times in  April,  Fintan  O’Toole  was  forthright  in  his  view  that
“Donald Trump has destroyed the country he has promised to make great again”: 
it is hard not to feel sorry for Americans. Most of them did not vote for Donald
Trump in 2016. Yet they are locked down with a malignant narcissist who, instead
of  protecting his  people  from Covid-19,  has  amplified  its  lethality.  The country
Trump promised to make great again has never in its history seemed so pitiful… the
idea of  the  US as  the  world’s  leading nation—an idea that  has  shaped the past
century—has all but evaporated… who is now looking to the US as the exemplar of
anything other than what not to do? How many people in Düsseldorf or Dublin are
wishing they lived in Detroit or Dallas? (O’Toole)
11 This unsparing judgment by one of Europe’s leading journalists would likely not have
been made even five years ago but was now resonant of op eds across Europe. The
growing consensus was that there was no expectation or even the vaguest hope that
the US would demonstrate moral leadership or promote liberal values in response to
the pandemic emergency. As European commentators regularly detailed Trump’s failed
leadership  during  the  pandemic  crisis  and  speculated  on  the  future  of  American
leadership,  American  media  began  to  pay attention.  In  April,  the  New York  Times
reported on the European disquiet,  citing several European intellectuals.  Dominique
Moisi, a political scientist at the Institut Montaigne in Paris, opined: “Europe’s social
democratic systems are not only more human, they leave us better prepared and fit to
deal  with  a  crisis  like  this  than  the  more  brutal  capitalistic  system  in  the  United
States.” Timothy Garton Ash, a professor of European history at Oxford University in
the UK, remarked on the inevitability of American decline: “You accumulate problems,
and because you’re such a strong player, you can carry these dysfunctionalities for a
long time…Until something happens and you can’t anymore” (Bennhold).
12 Such comments are indicative of the moralizing discourse among European elites in
commenting on US failings. This is not to say they are out of tune with public sentiment
for  the  widespread  antipathy  towards  Trump  in  Europe  only  intensified  as  the
pandemic  emergency  took  hold.  In  March,  Europeans  observed  the  Trump
administration  impose  a  30-day  ban  on  travel  from  Europe to  the  US,  without
consultation with European leaders, and read media reports on how Trump offered $1
billion to a German pharmaceutical company to secure monopoly rights to a potential
Covid-19  vaccine.  While  the  much-reported  story  was  denied  by  the  Trump
administration, many in Europe were prepared to believe it. There was also notice of
the US’ conspicuous absence from a virtual global summit of world leaders in early May
that  pledged  billions  of  dollars  to  develop  vaccines  to  fight  the  coronavirus  and
professed international solidarity in the face of the pandemic emergency. The US was
content  to  send  supportive  messaging  yet  refused  to  give  an  explanation  for  the
absence. The mounting public antipathy towards Trump and his administration was
evidenced by polls  and surveys in European states.  A survey by the Korber Siftung
foundation in Germany in mid-May found that “73 percent stated that their opinion
about  the  United  States  had  deteriorated  due  to  the  current  health  crisis”
(“Coronavirus Turns Germans More Critical”).
13 While such views were widely shared in Europe they elided discomforting realities and
growing apprehensions about the handling of the pandemic emergency in European
countries and by the EU leadership. In Italy in particular there was deep resentment at
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what  many Italians  perceived to  be  the lackluster  response of  the  EU in  providing
efficient help at an early stage of the pandemic. More broadly, old fault lines between
Northern and Southern Europe emerged in the rancorous and stalled discussions about
calls  for  collective  debt  issuance  to  deal  with  the  post-pandemic  recovery.  The  EU
struggled to keep internal  borders open and keep alive the principles of  the single
market and free movement. The governor of the Veneto region in Italy that “Schengen
no  longer  exists….  It  will  be  remembered  only  in  the  history  books”  (Dettmer).
Meanwhile,  Poland  and  Hungary  slid  further  towards  autocracy,  using  “a  state  of
emergency” to advance/extend the state’s powers. In Hungary the government evoked
Covid-19  to  allow  the  Prime  Minister  to  rule  by  decree,  arguing  that  “Today,  we
confront not a military power but are in a war-like state to defend our people against a
pandemic  the  likes  of  which  we  have  not  seen  in  a  century”  (McLaughlin).  The
demonstrable  lack of  solidarity  across  Europe in  managing the pandemic unnerved
proponents of political and economic union in the continent. In a rare public comment
on the EU in late March, former president of the European Commission Jacques Delors
warned  that  lack  of  solidarity  posed  “a  mortal  danger  to  the  European  Union”
(Rankin).  Reflecting  on  the  crisis  in  Italy,  the  former  European  Council  president
Donald Tusk remarked that “the loss of reputation is huge…. We must save Italy, Spain
and the whole of Europe and not be afraid of extraordinary measures. This is a state of
emergency” (Bailey). Leaders of the Munich Security Conference published an op ed
that signalled their alarm: “The task at hand is to save lives. But the task is also to save
the Union: Decision-makers must ensure that the EU emerges from the crisis strong
enough to deal with the challenges within and to hold its own in a world of great power
competition” (Ischinger and Ruge).
14 The  European  loss  of  confidence  in  American  leadership  proved  coincident  with  a
consuming  crisis  in  the  European  project.  That  crisis  is  at  once  geopolitical  and
biopolitical, which is to say it involves a sense of threat both externally and internally
to the ideas and institutions of union. The supranational weaknesses of the EU were
already becoming apparent before the Covid-19 pandemic.  Writing in 2016,  Thierry
Chopin and Jaen-Francois Jamet surveyed the challenges to the Pax Europeaea and noted
it was not a guarantee for social peace nor for domestic security across Europe.
European integration seems therefore to be directly threatened: as a space without
internal  borders,  it  raises  fears  of  contagion  of  the  crises  from  the  periphery
(geographic and economic) to the heart of  the Union,  without being adequately
equipped to rise  to  ensure a  collective,  Community wide response.  (Chopin and
Jamet)
15 Geopolitically, the pandemic emergency intensifies multiple threats and challenges to
the Union―the migration crisis,  terrorism, Brexit,  anti-European populism, and the
rise of China―and amplifies the growing realization that it can no longer count solely
on the US for its security nor on an imaginary West as the bastion of liberalism. The
pandemic has quickened the emergence of a new world order, which is likely to be a
new  era  of  great  power  competition.  There  is  evidence  that  European  publics  are
nervously comprehending this. A major survey in June 2020 by the European Council on
Foreign  Relations  (ECFR)  found  that  deep  public  disillusionment  with  the  EU  was
leavened by a desire for greater collaboration and cohesive action among European
states. The authors of the resulting report note that those seeking more cohesion in EU
action do not do so based on any idealized vision of European unity: “For them, Europe
is no longer mainly a project motivated by ideas and values, it is a community of fate
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that must cling together to take back control over its future.” The authors conclude:
“The driving force for more EU cooperation appears to be the way the coronavirus
crisis dramatically altered how fearfully the world beyond Europe is seen” (Krastev and
Leonard). This suggests a turn to realpolitik, a pragmatic response based not on trust
and solidarity―the founding principles of the EU―but fear and a heightened concern
for security.
16 The pandemic is also a biopolitical crisis that challenges the European project in that it
presages  re-evaluations  of  the  value(s)  of  political  and  social  life  and  how  this  is
administered. The many references to a “state of emergency,” perhaps most eagerly
enunciated by more authoritarian regimes such as Hungary but also articulated by the
EU, has sparked concerns about expansion of disciplinary state and inter-state powers.
The Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben identifies the pandemic emergency with “the
state  of  exception,  to  which  governments  have  habituated  us  for  some  time”  and
observes that “It is not surprising that for the virus one speaks of war. The emergency
measures  obligate  us  in  fact  to  live  in  conditions  of  curfew”  (Agamben,
“Clarifications”).  He  argues  that  “an  entire  society  has  acquiesced  to  feeling  itself
plague-stricken, to isolating itself at home, and to suspending its normal conditions of
life,  its  relationships  of  work,  friendship,  love,  and  even  its  religious  and  political
convictions”  (Agamben,  “Reflections  on  the  Plague”). Agamben’s  reading  of  the
pandemic threat as a continuation of regimes’ exercise of biopolitical power causing
widespread  sacrifice  of  social  relationships  has  been  widely  echoed  by  European
intellectuals. However, it has also been widely challenged by commentators who point
to evidence of solidarity and collective care provoked by the virus. This more optimistic
interpretation  of  the  impact  of  the  emergency  looks  at  emergent  forms  of  “civic
responsibility  and  mutual  aid,  a  ‘biopolitics  from  below’  of  informed  consent  to
unprecedented measures for the protection of the public health” (Pearce). The debate,
rarefied and nascent though it may be, indicates the mobile stakes in this conjunctural
moment of emergencies, with recognition of fragile co-dependencies both accentuating
fears  about  and  invoking  empathy  towards  others.  The  pandemic  has  underlined
inequalities,  proving the lie that the virus does not discriminate,  but also rendered
inequalities  more  visible  and  occasioned  fresh  discussions  about  the  undervalued
underclass  of  “emergency”  workers  (Butler).  The  conflicting  responses  indicate  a
suspension of “normal” social relations and widespread uncertainty about what will
constitute  a “new normal.”  It  remains  to  be  seen  how the  pandemic  will  play  out
politically―whether  it  will  give  rise  to  new  forms  of  population  management,
surveillance  and digital  tracking,  or  to  a  new politics  of  care―but  it  constitutes  a
significant  breech in  the  social  contract  (including  the  racial  contract)  in  Europe  ,
reorienting relationships between states and their subjects.
 
3. Race and Protest
17 Throughout June 2020, there were protests in cities across Europe in response to the
protests in the US sparked by the death of George Floyd. Expressions of solidarity were
the most common feature of the protests but they also invariably connected with and
expressed  local  matters  of  racial  division  and  injustice.  As  they  mutated
transnationally, the protests triggered activism and debates on police violence, racial
profiling, the detention of asylum seekers, and the removal of monuments. The range
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and intersectionality of issues reflect the multiple ways in which race is at the heart of
so many socio-political issues in Europe―and yet, race and racism are rarely addressed
so directly in many European countries, where denial is the norm. The protests have
both  opened  up  new  conversations  and  also  provoked  pushback  that  deflects  or
relegates  issues  of  racism  within  European  societies,  often  by  describing  them  as
“American.”
18 Racial dynamics in Europe are of course different to those in the US, reflecting different
histories and geographies of racial order, different legacies in the present, and different
conceptions of racial difference and racial justice―there are few countries in Europe
where racial discrimination is treated as a significant social justice issue. That official
data on “race” as a social identifier is uncommon in Europe, and strongly opposed in
many countries, is an indicator of the sensitivities around public or state recognition of
racism. In Europe racism is often framed as cultural or religious difference, thereby
displacing the primacy of race and yet perpetuating “color-blind racism” (Roig 614-15).
As the French intellectual Étienne Balibar wryly remarks, the “idea of a ‘racism without
race’ is not as revolutionary as one might imagine” (Balibar 23). Historical context is
important to understanding the different ways in which the US and European countries
have dealt  with legacies of  racism and colonialism. The British writer Gary Younge
points out: 
One of the differences between America and Europe is that when it comes to anti-
black  racism,  Europe’s  most  egregious  acts  took  place  abroad.  Our  civil  rights
movement took place abroad, our segregation, our slavery…. But the fact of that
distance, that arm’s length, means that it hasn’t been internalized in the same way.
And so there is this challenge to really teach the history in order to understand the
present. (“Gary Younge on Europe and the US”)
19 This is an important insight, for the distance Younge refers to continues to feed into
the disavowals of racism in Europe. This distance is both temporal and spatial: racism is
what happened in the past in European colonies or what happens in the present in the
US―Europe  remains  racially  innocent.  Psychological  and  ideological  screens  are
erected to sustain this sense of distance, including selective amnesia about colonial and
imperial  histories  of  European  countries.  The  morphing  of  protests  in  Europe  into
attacks on monuments and statues indicate a dramatic recognition of this amnesia,
making a battleground of the symbolic landscape of historical memory.
20 This  relative  European distance  from slavery  and civil  rights  activism is  crucial  to
understanding the different ways in which discourses of race and racism (including
anti-racism) are expressed and performed in Europe, and their relation to American
discourses.  It  can  both  enable  and  disarm  efforts  to  advance  understanding  and
activism  around  racism  in  Europe.  Younge  points  out  that  a  key  element  of  the
European disavowal of  racism is  a  displacement via (mis)identification with African
Americans:
From the vantage point of a continent that both resents and covets American power
and is in no position to do anything about it, African Americans represent to many
Europeans a redemptive force…. They see in black Americans a way of embracing
America―because you’re embracing that bit of America that is least co-opted, least
bought into the kind of power structure, least representative of the power… what
they’re trying to do is finding a way to embrace the America with which they have a
deeply  ambivalent  and  complicated  relationship….  And  here  stands  this  group,
which signifies both that America is not all that it claims to be, but that America
could be so much more. (Younge)
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21 Younge captures the imaginary force and ambivalence of white European enthralment
to an idea of America, fetishizing African Americans as redemptive figures. “George
Floyd isn’t just a murder, he’s a metaphor,” Younge observes, “He’s a metaphor for a
lack of democracy” (“Gary Younge on Europe and the US”).  This can be a powerful
symbolic rallying point for Europeans but also a displacement of more local registers
and instances of the precarity of black life in Europe. The fixation on racial injustices in
the  US  can  be  frustrating  and  challenging  for  black  activists  in  Europe.  Donnay
Musombo, an activist organizing a Black Lives Matter protest in Belgium, noted that
members of the Congolese community there “came to the conclusion that an African
American is considered more than an African. An African American is valued more than
an African…. It took George Floyd to have Europe listening to us” (Birnbaum). At the
same time, such attention can present opportunities to leverage a fresh recognition of
racism. A major challenge and opportunity has opened for activists in Europe as they
seek to mobilise public affects in defense of racial justice.
22 The European protests, in their performance, indicate the signifying cultural power of
the US and more particularly the symbolic resonance of American civil rights matters
across  the  world.  The  European  events  have  been  very  American  in  styling  and
messaging,  an example  of  the growing symbiosis  of  social  media  and transnational
protest movements to propel civic activism. A driving force is Black Lives Matter, the
American social movement that has become a globalized phenomenon with influential
circuits in youth and popular cultures as well as protest movements around the world.
The European protests replay iconic text and imagery via social media and placards,
banners and chants―“Black Lives Matter,” “I Can’t Breathe,” “No Justice, No Peace”
and “Silence is Betrayal.” Body language is also symbolic―a bent knee, a clenched fist,
shorthand  references  to  American  protest  iconography.  The  British  journalist  Ben
Judah  has  suggested  the  European  protests  signify  a  “new  transatlanticism”:
“Ironically, just as the old ideological West, of the G-7, transatlantic intellectuals and
NATO-focused think tanks is breaking down a new kind of transatlantic experience,
born out of a common virtual Instagram and TikTok world, is coming alive” (Tharoor).
This is a suggestive observation, recognizing the disruptions in transatlantic relations
and the uneasy interregnum that now exists, and the new circuits of communication
and activism that  link Europe and the  US.  Yet,  there  is  much in  this  new form of
transatlantic protest that is familiar from earlier forms. It is striking how much of the
signage at demonstrations in different countries is  in English,  clearly intended as a
messaging to the US. A common sign reads “The World is Watching.” In this there are
echoes of “anti-American” demonstrations in many cities during the Vietnam War and
again following the American invasion of Iraq. The protests act out the ambivalence
Younge refers to in European responses to American power, such that it is disavowed
via deep affiliations with American culture.
23 European  elites,  feeling  the  pressure  of  the  protests,  have  struggled  to  articulate
responses that would recognize and act on their import. Rather, they have fallen back
on  soft  statements  about  “the  erosion  of  America’s  moral  authority”  while  not
acknowledging significant issues of racial division or violence in Europe (Hernandez
and  Mueller).  For  those  still  promoting  “transatlanticism”  it  is  an  opportunity  to
remind America of its moral mission. Wolfgang Ischinger, a former German ambassador
to Washington and the chairman of the Munich Security Conference, stated: 
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People all over the world understand that their own fights for human rights, for
equality and fairness, will become so much more difficult to win if we are going to
lose America as the place where ‘I have a dream’ is a real and universal political
program….  Let’s  hope  the  demonstrations  all  over  the  world  will  help  remind
Washington that U.S. soft power is a unique asset, setting America apart from other
great powers—from China, Russia, and even from Europe. It would be tragic if the
Trump  Administration  turned  a  huge  opportunity  for  the  U.S.  into  a  moral
abdication. (Wright)
24 A similar statement was made by Sir Peter Westmacott, the former British Ambassador
to the United States, who remarked that many observers outside the US “are saddened
by the damage which President Trump and his Republican supporters are doing to the
values we share, to freedom of expression, to the rule of law…. And even―if he means
what he says―to democracy itself” (Wright). Such statements are exemplary of how
policy and political elites in Europe read the issue of protests in the US, distancing
them through the moralizing lens of geopolitical judgment that sees no domestic issues
of relevance in Europe.
25 This moral discourse is also explicitly used to disavow the presence of racism in Europe
as a structural or institutional presence―deflecting it as an “American scourge” (Rios).
Many politicians who express solidarity with the protestors and advance criticism of
the Trump administration remain wary of addressing European-based issues of racism.
In June 2020, EU Commissioner Margaritas Schinas stated that the police brutality and
protests in the US were “not likely… to happen in Europe at this scale…. I do not think
that we have issues now in Europe that blatantly pertain to police brutality or issues of
race  transcending  into  our  systems”  (Banks).  Schinas,  whose  post  includes
responsibility for “Promoting Our European Way of Life,” also observed that “There is
no doubt that Europe as a whole has been doing better than the United States in issues
of race, also because we have better systems for social inclusion, protection, universal
health care” (Barigazzi). Such clear statements of moral superiority have been called
out for their complacency and hypocrisy, with many pointing to the lack of diversity in
EU  institutions,  which  are  staffed  predominantly  by  white  people,  while  only  29
Members  of  the  European  Parliament,  3%  of  the  total,  are  people  of  color.  The
commonplace EU response to criticism of this lack of diversity is that EU recruitment
policies are “color blind”―a claim that has been challenged for several years via the
#BrusselsSoWhite Twitter campaign (Islam). The claim of color-blindness is not simply
glib hypocrisy, for it is a widely stated view across Europe in relation to debates about
racism,  reflecting  a  hegemonic  culture  of  denial  that  is  also  evidenced  in  public
reluctance to engage with the legacies of colonial history.
26 Part of the challenge for anti-racism activists in Europe is to disarticulate the grammar
of race, to disrupt both the deep structures and accepted discourses that normalize
everyday relations of racial power (Bonilla-Silva 181-86). As activists seek to leverage
the fixation on the US to force fresh recognition of racism in local contexts they draw
attention to culturally embedded grammars of racial power. In France, demonstrators
have  expressed  anger  at  racial  injustice  and  police  brutality,  particularly  toward
minorities from France’s former colonies in Africa. A key reference point in the large
protests has been the death of Adama Traore, a French black man who died in police
custody in Paris in 2016. The protests have greatly disturbed national complacencies
and silences around race in a country that has a deeply-rooted sense of itself as a color-
blind republic and refuses to recognize race or ethnicity as formal arbiters of social
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identity or difference. French law continues to prohibit the official collection of data on
race, ethnicity or religion and there have been moves in the French parliament to erase
the word “race” from the constitution. In lieu of public discussions about race in France
there has been widespread resentment and repudiation of identity politics as a foreign
concept, more particularly an American import, that threatens to undermine the social
contract and universal ideals. President Emanuel Macron articulated this perspective in
his  public  responses  to  the  protests,  saying  France  would  not  fall  into
“communitarianism,”  associated  with  American-style  identity  politics,  and  claiming
that  the  fight  against  racism  was  being  misappropriated  by  “separatists,”  a  coded
reference to the alien nature of such protesting in France (Girette). He reiterated the
common refrain of French leaders,  that individual racism was to be denounced but
structural  racism  did  not  exist.  Meanwhile,  France’s  Interior  Minister  Christophe
Castaner denied that there was institutional racism in French policing: “I refuse to say
that the institution is racist, but yes, there are racist police officers” and stressed that
“France is not the United States” (“France Set for New Antiracism Protests”).
27 The fresh perception of  racial  discord in  France has  sparked discussions  about  the
validity  of  what  are  widely  viewed  as  Anglo-American  concepts,  such  as  “identity
politics,” “white privilege” and “affirmative action.” In early June 2020, the novelist
Virginie Despentes published an open letter “to my white friends who do not see the
problem” in which she asked for acknowledgement that “white privilege” existed in
France (Despentes). It drew a heated response, attracting criticism from both right and
left,  charging Despentes with supporting an alien and divisive “communitarianism”
that will  produce “a new racism” (Badinter).  In Le Monde,  Corine Narassiguin of the
Socialist Party argued that “To import into France the expression ‘white privilege’ is to
want  to  tackle  the  history  of  the  United  States  on  the  history  of  France,  without
respecting either. It is to fabricate historical nonsense” (Narassiguin). The sociologist
Eric Fassin, writing in Liberation, counters by asking
what if we were living, in France as elsewhere, the end of the racial exception?.... It
is therefore not a matter of importing problems from abroad: in reality, American
news is only a catalyst. This transatlantic mirror sends us back our image today. In
short,  the end of  the racial  exception means that  the racialization of  society is
recognized  as  a  truly  democratic  issue…  has  the  time  come  to  assume  that
universalism does not suffer from exceptions? Is the Republic a national singularity,
or  must  it  be  part  of  a  common  democratic  logic? This  is  the  whole  issue  of
democracy, racial or sexual: the thing, not the word. (Fassin)
28 Fassin’s comments present the mirroring effect of the US protests as a deconstructive
force  that  disturbs  the  French  grammar  of  race,  parsing  the  ideological  distance
between the language and the practice of democracy.
29 In  Germany,  the  racial  issues  exposed  by the  protests  are  also  propelling  uneasy
discussions in mass and social media while referencing domestic issues and giving fresh
impetus to a halting public recognition of racism. As in France, Germany eschews the
collection of data on race and there is a general public silence around domestic matters
of racism, though shaped by a different historical legacy in which the Holocaust looms
large.  In  recent  years,  immigration—and  in particular,  the  2015  entry  of  nearly  a
million refugees into Germany―has intensified political commentary and protest in
the country, including growing unease about the violent activities of far right, white
supremacist  groups.  In  2018,  250,000  demonstrated  in  the  “Unteilbar”  (Indivisible)
march in Berlin against racism. In early June 2020, tens of thousands marched in “silent
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demonstrations” across Germany to express solidarity with US protests following the
murder  of  George  Floyd.  As  in  France,  there  is  unease  about  the  usage  of  Anglo-
American language around race and protesting. As the term “Antifa” became widely
used in American media and reported abroad,  it  caused particular consternation in
Germany where it is shorthand for “antifaschistisch” (or anti-fascist) and has troubling
historical connotations for many. The hashtag #IchBinAntifa (“I am antifa”) has been
embraced by left wing groups and provoked backlash (Staudenmaier). These and other
national European environments of protest signal the varied ways in which racism and
anti-racism are configured by both local and global discourses. A key drive in protests
in  both  Europe  and  the  US  has  been  to  illuminate  the  biopolitics  of  racial
discrimination, to ask: why do some lives and bodies matter? That question―impelled
and inscribed in Black Lives Matters―has both universal and particular connotations.
It  emphasizes  racialized  definition  of  who counts  as  “human,”  while  also  entailing
other identifiers of inclusion and exclusion, including: who counts as European? This is
to  say  that  race  and  racism  in  Europe  must  be  understood  in  terms  of
immigration―that is, in terms of the influx of previously colonized peoples and the
anxieties  (and  violence)  this  has  induced.  That  the  protests  invariably  took  up
questions of empire and coloniality acknowledges how a history of racial violence and
exclusion has shaped the biopolitics of the present, including the ongoing vulnerability
of black populations. The symbolic grafting of Black Lives Matter onto protests against
European states’ treatment of refugees and asylum seekers underlines that the migrant
crisis is a racial crisis. To understand racism, following American scholar-activist Ruth
Gilmore’s definition, as “the state-sanctioned or extralegal production and exploitation
of group-differentiated vulnerability to premature death,” is  to comprehend how it
diminishes the life chances of marginalised people (Gilmore 28). Beyond its import as a
transnational civil rights movement, Black Lives Matter has become a floating signifier
of Europe’s racial unconscious, helping to illuminate that which is disavowed (Younge).
 
4. Conclusion
30 Taken together, the health emergency caused by the Covid-19 pandemic and the race
emergency caused by the protests against racist policing form a conjunctural crisis that
challenges the present coherence and future legitimacy of the European Union and
transatlantic relations. The challenge is especially acute due to the combined focus of
both  emergencies  on  the  governance  of  populations.  Fears  of  demographic
change―more particularly, large influxes of non-white peoples―have excited white
racial  anxieties  in  the  Global  North,  provoking  nationalist  surges,  and  producing
dystopian visions of the future (Smith and Vasudevan 212). The perceived threat is at
once geopolitical and biopolitical, a crisis of futurity that is relative to growing white
precarity, hence the pitch of unease at the prospect of a “post-American” world.3 In
Europe  this  unease  is  not  caused  by  the  presidency  of  Trump,  though it  has  been
dramatically  exacerbated  by  it;  rather,  it  is  presaged  by  Europe’s  long  overdue
reckoning with what Hannah Arendt termed “the consequences of her own history”
and a consequent diminishment of the fantasy of America as a liberal and redemptive
power.
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NOTES
1. I refer to fantasy here as playing a constitutive role in the formations and narratives of states
and nations (Rose 1-16; Pease 198-203).
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2. The phrase “This is not America” has been widely used by commentators in Europe pushing
back at what they perceive (or seek to frame) as US-centric ideas in debates on race in particular.
The construction has obvious ambiguity, registering a gap between American ideals and realities
while the meaning slips between provocation and lament. In the US, it  is commonly used by
liberal commentators to decry the Trump administration’s corruption of American values. That
ambiguity  has  been  pointedly  referenced  in  the  Chilean  artist  Alfredo  Jaar’s  “A  Logo  for
America,”  a  series  of  electronic  billboards,  one  of  which  combines  the  words  “This  is  Not
America” transposed on an outline map of the US. It was originally displayed in Times Square in
1987, referencing the Reagan administration and more particularly its interventions in Central
America  at  that  time.  Displayed  in  Times  Square  again  in  2014,  it  was  interpreted  as  a
commentary on the Obama administration’s treatment of migrants. In 2016, it was displayed in
Piccadilly  Square  in  London,  and  interpreted  as  a  symbolic  rejoinder  to  then  presidential
candidate Donald Trump’s “Make America Great Again” logo (Simon).
3. The  “post-American  world,”  a  term first  popularised  by  Fareen  Zakaria,  refers  not  to  an
emergent order of American defeat or irrelevance, rather it is one of relative American (and
Western) decline and the “rise of the rest,” most notably of China (Zakaria).  On the looming
future of a “Post-America Europe,” see Thomas Wright, “A Post-America Europe and the Future
of U.S. Strategy” (Wright).
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